By: Mark Camilleri
The line, it is drawn, the curse, it is cast. And so Brexit Day passed on January 31, 2020 – the day that the United Kingdom formally departed from the European Union. The 3 years, 7 months and 8 days from the day that the UK voted to leave the EU has been a turbulent time in UK politics, best described as Sturm und Drang (or ‘storm and stress’ in the English vernacular). It is a term used to describe a movement in German literature characterized by intense action and emotionalism; of an individual’s revolt against society. It is also the name given to a group of symphonies written by the 18th century Austrian composer Joseph Hadyn, including the aptly named “Farewell” symphony (and, with sympathy to those wishing the UK to remain in the EU, the “Mourning” symphony).
Historically it could be argued that the Brexit process did not start with the UK referendum nor has it ended on Brexit Day. The UK has, from the beginning of the EU project, been a persistently challenging piece to place in the wider EU jigsaw.
But Brexit Day is important. It is important because it marks an end to the uncertainty about whether the UK leaves or remains part of the EU. This issue was one for the UK to decide for itself. From Brexit Day forward, the question of the UK’s relationship with the EU will no longer be exclusively for the UK to decide. Instead the relationship will increasingly be determined by decisions taken across the Channel.
In the short term (that is, from now until – at least – the end of 2020), the new EU-UK relationship will manifest itself in the form of a formal trade dialogue under the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement. Much ink – and many more pixels – will be spent on what that form of relationship should look like. The drama of these discussions will shift from London to Brussels and back, as is the case in any trade negotiation with the EU.
Focusing on the form of relationship, however, misses a more fundamental point: from Brexit Day onwards, the UK is a third country in relation to the EU. Whatever form the new relationship takes, the UK will no longer be part of the EU club and, as a consequence, will have to devote more energy and resources in promoting its interests – and those of its industry – with and in Brussels, the heart of EU decision-making.
Leaving aside the bravado of certain groups within the UK, the UK cannot ignore what transpires in Brussels nor its regulatory output. The fact remains that the EU is and will remain the dominant power in the EU-UK relationship. While the departure of the UK will have a negative effect on the EU (no matter what agreement might be reached), the EU will continue to exert significant economic might. It will continue to be a global rule maker by virtue of the “Brussels Effect” – a term coined by Anu Bradford (and a topic that MicroBRU will focus on in the near future) referring to the power of the EU to create rules and regulations that have global reach. Having been a member and an erstwhile leader of the EU, this is a reality that the UK knows and is, without a doubt, grappling with. As the Commission President Von Der Leyen recently stated, “There is a great difference between being a member country or not.”
As a member of the EU, the UK was able to influence EU positions (and therefore its own interests) not just in Brussels, but also in the capitals of other member state countries as fellow EU club members. Similarly, UK industry and business would have enjoyed the benefits of EU membership across various pan-EU institutions and associations, with the power to influence from within. To be sure, the UK enjoyed considerable influence – both formal and informal – in Brussels and throughout the EU largely because it led on many key policy issues such as trade and economic liberalization. The vision of the EU Single Market – undoubtedly the EU’s greatest achievement and strength – was a vision promoted by UK Prime Minister Thatcher and subsequent UK leaders.
Following Brexit Day, the UK must adapt to the new realities of negotiating and influencing from outside the EU club. This means dealing with the EU en bloc and in Brussels. The UK has already experienced the futility of by-passing Brussels and EU institutions in its attempt to negotiate the Withdrawal Agreement. While the remaining member states will of course continue to receive (and engage with) the UK, they owe a higher duty of loyalty to their fellow EU member states and the EU itself. Such other EU member states already seem to have adapted to this new reality by forming new coalitions to fill the void left by the abrupt withdrawal of the UK from its ranks.
In the first instance, the new reality will require a greater presence of UK officials and industry representatives in Brussels itself. This will mean a more overtly pro-UK Mission to the EU and similarly oriented UK industry groups and associations representing UK interests. But, while the UK will surely have more voices in Brussels, its voice will be less heard – yet another of the many ironies of Brexit.
To help it address this dilemma, the UK (including its industry groups) should seek out new coalitions, ones including other like-minded non-EU countries to help amplify its voice in the EU decision-making process. Canada is an obvious candidate country given the strong political and economic (not to mention historical) bonds enjoyed between the two countries. What is more for the UK government, Canada has an enviable comprehensive trade agreement with the EU and enjoys unparalleled access to, and trade with, the US market. Japan is another potential partner for many similar reasons.
Canada has much greater access to the US market than the UK, but shares many of the regulatory concerns and objectives of the EU (and for that matter the UK), thus making it a good partner for both the EU and the US. By identifying and working with such other countries, rather than adopting a go-it-alone strategy (or taking on overtly pro-US positions on EU regulatory policy), the UK can better achieve its seemingly incompatible strategy of maintaining a strong trading relationship with the EU while simultaneously increasing its trade with the US.
Such an approach could see continued UK leadership on many issues in Brussels, but should not substitute its voice for those of its partners. Instead, the UK should encourage greater EU engagement and presence of such countries and their respective industry groups in Brussels itself where they can promote shared interests with different – but transparent – voices, which in turn should lead to better informed and satisfactory EU regulation.
By following this path, the UK (not to mention the EU and other countries like Canada) might find a silver lining in the sturm.